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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORP. AND
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13610

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Suit by architect Beecher for additional fees claimed
to be owed for extra architectural services and expenses for Metropolitan Hall of Justice complex resulting from (a) change by Defendants to spread-out type
structure after architect Beecher had worked for 10
months on a high-rise concept, and (b) increase of 2%
times in construction time resulting from later decision
of Defendants to build project in two phases rather than
as a single project.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was scheduled for trial January 12, 1973,
(R. 211), was re-scheduled for February 22, 1973, (R.
235), was pre-tried February 22, 1973, at which time the
Court indicated that the case would be tried within a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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week or two, and scheduled a trial date for March 7,
1973, (R. 309). A further pre-trial conference was held
.March. 5, 1973, not reported — R. 309). No further
headings occurred (although requested by Beeches)
until immediately before Judge Wilkins resigned as a
judge when Judge Wilkins granted summary judgment
dismissing Plaintiff's claims, although no motion for
summary judgment was filed. A transcript of the pretrial hearings held 10 months earlier was not available
at the time that summary judgment was ordered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of summary judgment of dismissal and
remand for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Beecher incorporates by reference the
statement of facts contained in it's original brief herein
(P. 2-5).
The statement of facts contained in Defendants'
brief includes considerable argument, and is inaccurate
in many particulars, however since their statement of
alleged facts is 13 pages long, much of which is immaterial to the issues involved in this appeal, Plaintiff
Beecher will not attempt a detailed answer thereto,
except to the extent that they are answered in responding to individual points raised by Defendants. However,
a few general comments may be helpful to understand
the basic problems.
Defendants indicate (pages 3 and 4 of Defendants'
brief) that since the Defendants changed their minds
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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as to the type of structure that they desired (after
architect Beecher had worked for 10 months under the
the direction of Defendants' agent designing a high-rise
building) that they could simply refuse to approve that
work and avoid payment. The contract expressly requires payment by Defendants for abandoned work.
(See discussion on page 4 of Plaintiff's original brief
and R. 29, Par. # 4).
Defendants' incorrectly claim (Pages 4 and 5 of
brief) they somehow had a right to terminate Beecher's
contract simply because they decided to abandon the
high-rise concept. The only breach of contract was by
Defendants, not Beecher. Defendants seek to take advantage of their own wrong in refusing to approve the
work done by Beeecher and to thereby escape payment
for that work.
Defendants' also incorrectly claim (Pages 4, 8 and
9) that the supplemental agreement (R. 34, 35, 45, 46)
of November 10, 1960, constitutes a waiver of Beecher's
right to be paid for extra work done thereafter by
Beecher. No such waiver can be found or inferred from
that supplemental agreement. See discussion on page
10 of Beecher's original brief. The supplemental agreement simply approved early payment of a part of Beecher's architect fee, waived the contractural provision requiring prior approval of Defendants before payment
for architectual work (since the high-rise concept was
being abandoned and would not be approved). See discussion on pages 9-10 of Beecher's original brief.
Defendants' also apparently fail to realize that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contract for architectual services was made well before
the work started on the high-rise building concept
(early 1960); that the supplemental agreement was
made when the decision was made to abandon the highrise concept (Nov. 1960); that the construction contract
was not made until the building design had been completed (work commenced about June, 1963 — R. 64-68).
The fact that the building construction proceeded according to schedule is not inconsistent with Plaintiff's
claim that a construction period of two years was contemplated when the original and supplemental contracts
were executed, since the decision to build a two-phase
project was made after those contracts were signed and
before the construction contract was executed. The
construction contract expressly provided for a two-phase
construction project. Since the decision to complete the
police facilities prior to commencing construction on
the courts building (two-phase construction decision)
was made well after execution of the supplemental
agreement, that agreement could not constitute a waiver
of Plaintiff's claims for extra work resulting from the
decision to construct the project in two phases, which
decision caused the construction period to take 21/2 times
the time contemplated when the architectual contracts
were entered into.
"POINT I

'

P L A I N T I F F IS CONTRACTUALLY ENTITLED TO
EXTRA COMPENSATION RESULTING FROM EXTENDED CONSTRUCTION PERIOD

Defendants' point I asserts that since no specific
time is fixed in the contract within which the architecDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tural work is to be completed, that as a matter of law
Plaintiff is not entitled to extra compensation by reason
of extending construction period 2% times the period
originally contemplated. In support of that proposition
counsel for Defendants cite Osterling v. First National
Bank, 105 A. 633 (Pa. 1918); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Architects,
Sec. 14 at P. 676, and McDonald Brothers v. Whitney
County Court, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 874 (1887), 20 ALR 1356.
Those cases do not support Defendants' position. In the
Osterling case the court expressly held that since the
cost of the project was doubled by the extra work, and
the architect's fee was increased proportionately, that
the architect was adequately compensated for his extra
work, and in that case the court pointed out that the
contract made no provision for extra compensation
under those circumstances. Our case differs from the
Osterling case since the cost of the project was not
increased as a result of the change from a high-rise to
the present design, so Beecher has not been compensated
by increased fees from the change; also our contract expressly provides that defendants will pay extra compensation to Beecher for extra services and expenses:
"EXTRA SERVICES AND SPECIAL CASES.
If the Architect is caused extra drafting or other
expenses due to changes ordered by the Owner, . . .
he shall be equitably paid for such extra expense
and the service involved . . ." (R. 29, 4)
See also Beecher original brief P. 3 and 13.
In the McDonald Brothers v. Whitney, supra case
relied upon by Defendants provision had been made for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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payment of extra compensation to the architect in the
event of delay, by deducting that compensation from
the amounts due to the contractor. The court in that
case also simply found that the owner was not contractually obligated to pay extra compensation to the
architect by reason of an extended construction period.
Both cases support the claim of Beecher. A careful reading of both cases indicates that had the architect's contract contained a provision for payment by owner for
extra work (such as is contained in the contract between
Beecher and Defendants) that the owners would probably have been held liable for the extra compensation
sought.
An architectural contract is no different from any
other contract, and it should be construed according to
the usual rules of construction and evidence. Issues of
fact remain for trial as to whether or not:
(a) The supplemental contract constitutes a waiver
by Beecher of the right to be paid for extra work resulting from the later decision to build the project in
two phases and to thereby increase the construction
period from the contemplated 2 year period to 4% years.
If Defendants deny that the decision to change to a twophase construction was made after execution of the
supplemental agreement, then an issue of fact remains
for trial concerning that issue.
(b) Contrary to the assertions by Defendants, no
claim is made for work done prior to the supplemental
agreement (Nov. 1960). One claim asserted by Beecher
(item *2 — see P. 4 of Beecher's original brief) is a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claim for the cost of preparing new drawings (after the
agreement of Nov. 1960) to replace the abandoned plans.
Counsel for Defendants was apparently confused into
believing that a claim is asserted for work done prior
to the November 1960 agreement by the fact that some
costs incurred prior to that date were used in estimating
the cost of preparing the new plans. An issue of fact
remains for trial as to whether or not the supplemental
agreement precludes Beecher from claiming compensation for redesigning and redrafting the abandoned plans.
See discussion on pages 9-13 and 16-17 of Beecher's
original brief.
(c) See also other issues of fact remaining for trial
and discussion on pages 15-18 of Beecher's original brief
herein.
Defendants' assertions that Becher was paid a "generous" fee for his work (P. 17 of Defendants' brief); that
Beecher received extra compensation for extra work
orders (P. 20 & 22) and received some extra payment to
reimburse Beecher for extra compensation to one onsite inspector (P. 18, 19 & 22) are wholly immaterial to
the issues involved in Beecher's claim for extra compensation for other services, costs and expenses which
Beecher claims to be entitled to be paid under the terms
of the contract. Reference to those items appears to be
an emotional plea which in essence says that the architectural fees are already high enough so Defendants
should ignore the contract and simply refuse to pay
more. Counsel for defendants is not in a position to determine the adequacy of the compensation to be paid to
Beecher for the architectural work. Defendants and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Beecher made that determination when they drafted
and signed the contracts for architectural work, and the
only issue now before the court is a determination of
the amounts owed to Beecher for those services.
The statement made on page 17 of Defendants' brief
purporting to restate the terms of the contract between
Beecher and Defendants concerning circumstances
where Beecher was to be paid extra compensation are
incorrect and misleading. Defendants state therein that
". . . extra compensation was agreed to be paid if: (a)
Changes were made in approved drawing, (b) . . . (c)
Expenses were incurred because work designed or specified on the approved project was abandoned or suspended. Nothing whatever is said in paragraph # 4 of
the contract between the parties which limits the right
of Beecher to be paid for changes to "approved drawings"
or to work abandoned on an "approved project/' Defendants then go on to argue that since they did not
approve the abandoned drawings that they were under
no obligation to pay for them, and by implication that
since the final drawings were not approved until after
the decision to build the project in two phases had been
made that Beecher should not be paid for these claims
since they were not "approved." If we were to follow
that reasoning to it's logical conclusion we would necessarily conclude that no rights were vested in Beecher by
the contract unless the Defendants decided to give him
those rights by "approving" matters covered by the contract. Such reasoning falls by it's own weight.
The contract between the parties appointed the Salt
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lake City Engineer as Defendants' representative and
required that Beecher ". . . perform and conduct all
required services under his direction and supervision
. . ." (R. 32, Par. 13). The City Engineer worked with
Beecher for 10 months designing a high-rise project (R.
286), which constituted acceptance by the Defendants
of the work being done. Defandants' claim that their
respective commissions had not "accepted" the work is
unacceptable. Factual issues concerning waiver, estoppel, etc. remain for trial concerning these issues.
POINT II
NOVEMBER 1960 AGREEMENT DOES NOT BAR
BEECHER'S CLAIMS

Beecher's discussion concerning the terms and effect
of the original agreements are set forth on pages 9-13
and 16-18 of Beecher's original brief and will not be
repeated here. That discussion adequately demonstrates
that issues of fact remain for trial concerning the effect
and applicability of that agreement to Beecher's various
claims. However, a few of the factual statements recited
under point II in Defendants' brief require further comment.
Defendants claim that they decided to not approve
the high-rise work done by Beecher "after seeing the
preliminary work" (Defendants' brief P. 25). This is
simply untrue since Defendants representative was
working daily with Beecher in designing that work, and
since the Defendants simply changed their mind as to
the type of structure desired after Beecher had proDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ceeded in good faith for 10 months. Defendants should
pay for their change of mind, not Beecher. The only
reason that the Defendants claim that the work was
"unsatisfactory" (defendant brief P. 26) is because they
changed their minds, not because there was anything
wrong with the work.
Defendants again assert (P. 26) that they had no
obligation to pay for the abandoned drawings because
that work was "unapproved." The contract with Beecher
expressly requires Defendants to pay for abandoned
work (R. 29, Par. 4). Defendants would have the Court
believe that the abandoned drawings were "unacceptable" because of some default or misconduct by Beecher,
when in fact Defendants' representative had approved
all work on those drawings as they progressed and the
only reason for abandoning those drawings was because
Defendants decided not to build a high-rise building.
In point I, sub-paragraph 2 (page 6-7) of Plaintiffs
original brief it is pointed out that items #7 and 8 of
Plaintiff's claim for extra compensation (R. 53-54, 69
& page 5 of brief) are not disputed, that this work was
extra work not included in the architects contract, and
that the Defendants had acknowledge liability for those
claims (R. 89-90, Par. 7 & 8), but that the court had
overlooked this admission of liability and had improperly dismissed those claims. In response Defendants
point out that these services were performed prior to
October 7, 1966, (Pages 12-13 of Defendants' brief), apparently thereby inferring that they should be barred
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as having been performed prior to the date of the supplemental agreement of November 10, 1960, (R. 34-37).
Obviously a 1960 agreement could not bar a claim for
extra work performed in 1966. Either Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendants for items #7 and
8 of their claim (P. 5 of Plaintiff's brief), or an issue
of fact remains for trial as to whether or not the work
included in those claims is extra work not required by
the contract.
Questions of waiver, estoppel, etc. raised by counsel
for Defendants in their brief (p. 27-28) are clearly issues
of fact which require a trial. Defendants' motion is not
supported by affidavits, etc., so there are no established
facts to support those claims, and summary judgment
under those facts to support those claims, and summary judgment under those circumstances is improper.
POINT III
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN FOR TRIAL ON ITEM
NO. 6

Defendants' brief asserts that the taxpayers suit did
not involve architectural services and accordingly that
Beecher is not entitled to pay under his contract. The
lawsuit involved the design of the jail, the adequacy of
the jail equipment bid, and obviously did involve primarily architectural services. The record is devoid of
any affidavit or other established and uncontested facts
which refute Beecher's claim. Beecher's verified claim
(R. 53) creates an issue of fact for trial and precludes
summary judgment on this item.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT IV

ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN FOR TRIAL CONCERNING THE TIMELINESS OF FILING OF
CLAIMS AND OF LAWSUIT. QUESTION OF
TIMELINESS IS ALSO NOT BEFORE THE COURT

The district court dismissed only a part of Plaintiff's claims, leaving items # 3 and 5 of Plaintiff's claim
for trial (R. 248, 250). All claims filed by Plaintiff were
included in a single instrument filed with the Defendants (R. 47-59) and a single lawsuit. If the district
court had determined that Plaintiff's claims or lawsuit
were untimely the entire lawsuit would have been dismissed. Reserving of some claims for trial constitutes
an unequivocal holding by the district court that the
claims and lawsuits were filed on a timely basis, or that
issues of fact remained for trial concerning the timeliness of those claims and of this lawsuit. Defendants did
not file a cross-appeal as permitted by Rule 74(b), URCP,
and cannot now appeal to this court from the clear decision of the district court denying their defenses concerning timeliness. The Court simply has no jurisdiction
to entertain Defendants' claims concerning timeliness
since they failed to file an appeal to this Court within
the time required by law. The filing of a timely appeal
is jurisdictional. Ratliff, Estate of v. Conrad, 19 U. (2d)
346, 431 P. 2d 571.
Defendants argue that the services of Beecher were
completed at an earlier date and that the claim was not
filed on a timely basis (P. 13-14 P. 34-38), however, Defendants admit that they wrote a letter terminating the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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services of Beecher April 22, 1970, (Exhibit "VII" to
Plaintiff's complaint, R. 71). The only purpose of such
a letter would be to terminate employment then existing. Had it been terminated earlier no such letter would
have been necessary. If Defendants desire to now impeach their own letter an issue of fact remains for trial
concerning the date upon which the services were completed or terminated.
Defendants further argue that the lawsuit was not
filed within a year after denial of the claim (P. 38-41).
The record shows to the contrary. Exhibits "IX" (R.
73) and "X" (R. 74) to Plaintiff's complaint are letters
from the Defendants denying Plaintiff's claim May 21,
1970, and July 15, 1970. This lawsuit was filed April 2,
1971, (R. 1), well within one year after the denial of
Plaintiff's claim. Defendants' assertions that the claims
were denied as a matter of law at an earlier date raise
issues of fact which require a trial in view of Defendants
letters of denial (R. 73 & 74), including questions of
waiver, estoppel, etc.
The record does not disclose the filing of a motion
for summary judgment, but simply that the Court heard
the pre-trial on February 22, 1973, at which time it was
continued to March 5, 1973, (R. 246), and that further
pre-trial was held March 5, 1973, at which time the
minute entry recites that "The Court takes the issues
under advisement." Counsel for Defendants filed memorandum of authorities on questions of whether Plaintiff's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could
be granted (R. 251-254) and on questions of lack of consideration and economic compulsion and duress (R. 255258). Digitized
No memorandum
was filed with the district court
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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concerning the questions timeliness now attempted to be
raised for the first time on appeal, and that question was
not discussed on the record at the pre-trial hearing (R.
283-310). The minute entry (R. 248) and order granting summary judgment (R. 249-250) do not mention the
new issues concerning the timeliness of the claims or
lawsuit. Defendants cannot raise the issue of timeliness
for the first time on appeal. Dolores Uranium Corp. v.
Jones, 382 P. 2d 883, 14 U. 2d) 280.
CONCLUSION
The Court is referred to the summary in it's original
brief (P. 15-18) where issues of fact requiring trial are
discussed. This reply brief is filed in order to respond
to new issues raised and to clarify statements contained
in the Defendants' brief.
No motion for summary judgment appears in the
record or in the transcript of the pre-trial hearing. The
minute entry reflects that the Court took the issues
under advisement. (R. 247) Ten months later, and immediately before Judge Wilkins resigned, Judge Wilkins
granted summary judgment. (R. 248). It appears that
the delay in ruling, together with the press of trying to
clear the Court's calendar, may have resulted in an
incomplete consideration of the issues and an improper
summary judgment. Issues of fact remain for trial
which preclude granting of summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Appellants
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